Despite the impressive performance of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) on various vision tasks, they still exhibit erroneous high sensitivity toward semantic primitives (e.g. object pose). We propose a theoretically grounded analysis for DNNs robustness in the semantic space. We qualitatively analyze different DNNs semantic robustness by visualizing the DNN global behavior as semantic maps and observe interesting behavior of some DNNs. Since generating these semantic maps does not scale well with the dimensionality of the semantic space, we develop a bottom-up approach to detect robust regions of DNNs. To achieve this, We formalize the problem of finding robust semantic regions of the network as optimization of integral bounds and develop expressions for update directions of the region bounds. We use our developed formulations to quantitatively evaluate the semantic robustness of different famous network architectures. We show through extensive experimentation that several networks, though trained on the same dataset and while enjoying comparable accuracy, they do not necessarily perform similarly in semantic robustness. For example, InceptionV3 is more accurate despite being less semantically robust than ResNet50. We hope that this tool will serve as the first milestone towards understanding the semantic robustness of DNNs.
Introduction
As a result of recent advances in machine learning and computer vision, deep neural networks (DNNS) has become an essential part of our lives. DNNs are used to suggest articles to read, detect people in surveillance cameras, automate big machines in factories, and even diagnose Xrays for patients in hospitals. So What is the catch here? These DNNs struggle from a detrimental weakness on specific naive scenarios, despite having a strong performance on average. Figure 1 shows how a small perturbation on the view angle of the teapot object results in a drop in InceptionV3 [36] confidence score from 100% to almost 0%. The softmax confidence scores are plotted against one seangle:122 We show how for a simple teapot object, perturbing the azimuth view angle of the object can dramatically affect the score of InceptionV3 [36] score of the teapot class. (bottom):We show a plot of the softmax confidence scores of different DNNs on the the same teapot object viewed from 360 degrees around the object. For comparison, Lab researchers identified the object from all angles (18 equally spaced samples) mantic parameter (i.e., the azimuth angle around the teapot) and it fails in such a simple task. Similar behaviors are consistently observed across different DNNs (trained on ImageNet [31] ). Figure 2 shows that even after averaging over different shapes, we observe a similar behaviour, but with less severity. Furthermore, because DNNs are not easily interpretable, they work well without a complete understanding of why they behave in such manner. A whole direction of research is dedicated to study and analyze DNNs. Examples of such analysis is activation visualization [9, 40, 25] , noise injection [11, 26, 3] , and studying effect of image manipulation on DNNs [13, 13, 12] . We provide a new lens of semantic robustness analysis of such DNNs as can be seen in Figure 1 and subsequent figures. These Network Semantic Maps (NSM) demonstrate unexpected behavior of some DNNs in which adversarial regions lies inside a very confident region of the semantic space, which constitutes a "trap" that is hard to detect without such analysis and can lead to catastrophic failure of the DNN.
Recent work in the adversarial attacks explores the DNNs' sensitivity and perform gradient updates to derive targeted perturbations [38, 14, 6, 24] . In practice, such attacks are less likely to naturally occur than semantic attacks, such as changes in camera viewpoint and lighting conditions. The literature on semantic attacks is sparser since they are more subtle and challenging to analyze [41, 18] . This is due to the fact we are not able to distinguish between failure cases that result from the network structure, and learning, or from the data bias [39] . The current methods for adversarial semantic attacks either work on individual examples [1] , or try to find distributions but rely on sampling methods which do not scale with dimensionality [18] . We present a novel approach to finds robust/adversarial regions in the n-dimensional semantic space that scale better than sampling-based methods [18] , and we use such algorithm to quantify semantic robustness of popular DNNs on a collected dataset.
Contributions. (1)
We analyze the networks on the semantic lens showing unexpected behavior in the 1,2D semantic space. (2) We develop a new method to detect regions in the semantic space that the DNN behaves robustly/poorly that scale well with increasing dimensions (unlike other sampling-based methods). The method is optimization based and follows rigorously from optimizing the bounds around a point of interest. (3) We develop a new metric to measure semantic robustness of DNNs that we dub Semantic Robustness Volume Ratio (SRVR), and we use it to benchmark famous DNNs on a collected dataset.
Related Work

Understanding Deep Neural Networks
Deep Learning and DNNs are black-box tools that work well on average on a wide range of tasks. However, due to limited understanding of their behavior, a whole direction of research is dedicated to study and analyze neural networks. There are different lenses to analyze DNNs depending on the purpose of analysis. A famous line of works tries to visualize the network hidden layers by inverting the activations to get a visual image that represents a specific activation [9, 25, 40] . Others observe the behavior of these networks under injected noise [11, 2, 4, 15, 37, 3] . Sax et al. analyze the deep networks from the lens of information theory and show how the choice of activation layers affect the learning from entropy perspective [32] . Geirhos et al.
shows that changing the texture of the object while keeping the borders can hugely deteriorate the recognizability of the object by the DNN [13] . More closely related to our work is the work of Fawzi et al., which shows that geometric changes in the image affect the performance of the classifier greatly [12] . They also propose a probabilistic analysis framework to measure the robustness under these nuisance transformations (e.g., perspective and illumination) [10] , but they are limited to non-semantic 2D image transformation.
Adversarial Attacks on Deep Neural Networks
Pixel-based Adversarial Attacks. The way that DNNs fail for some noise added to the image motivated the adversarial attacks literature. Szegedy first introduced a formulation of attacking neural networks as an optimization [38] . The method minimizes the perturbation of the image pixels, while still fooling a trained classifier to predict a wrong class label. Several works followed the same approach but with different formulations [14, 24, 27, 6] . However, all these methods are limited to pixel perturbations and only fool classifiers, while we consider more general cases of attacks, e.g. changes in camera viewpoint to fool a DNN by finding adversarial regions. Most of these attacks are whitebox attacks, in which the algorithm has access to network gradients. Another direction of adversarial attacks treat the classifiers as a black box, in which the adversary only can quarry points and get a score from the classifier without backpropagating through the DNN [28, 8] . We formulate the problem of finding the region as an optimization of the corners of hyper-rectangle in the semantic space in both a black box fashion ( only function evaluations ) as well as the white box formulation which utilizes the gradient of the function.
Semantic Adversarial Attacks. Moving away from pixel perturbation to semantic 3D scene parameters, Zeng et al. [41] generate attacks on deep classifiers by perturbing scene parameters like lighting and surface normals. They show that the most common image space adversarial attacks are not authentic and cannot be realized in real 3D scenes. These semantic parameters are the same parameters studied in the Vision as Inverse Graphics paradigm [16, 17] . A completely different approach of VIG is to make the graphics operations differentiable from the beginning, which allows for an easy inverting by taking the gradient of the image to the parameters input directly. The most notable work in differentiable rendering is the Neural Mesh renderer (NMR) by Kato et al. [22] . NMR approximates the non differentiable rasterization by a differentiable counterpart, allowing the full rendering pipeline to be differentiable and implementing the technique in Pytorch [29] , which lead to broad adoption. We use NMR as our primary rendering method of meshes since we can obtain the gradient of the composite function of the network and the Renderer to the semantic parameters, which is necessary for our Algorithm 2. Recently Hamdi et al. proposes generic adversarial attacks that incorporate semantic and pixel attacks, in which they define the adversarial attack as sampling from some latent distribution, and they learn a GAN on filtered semantic samples [18] . However, their work used sampling-based approach to learn these adversarial regions, which does not scale with the dimensionality of the problem.
Optimizing Integral Bounds
Naive Approach. To develop an algorithm for robust region finding, we adopt an idea of weekly supervised activity detection in videos by Shou et al. [33] . The idea works on maximizing the inner average while minimizing the outer average of the function in the region and optimizing the bounds to achieve the objective. This is achieved because optimizing the bounds to maximize the area exclusively can lead to diverging the bounds to −∞, ∞. To solve the issue of diverging bounds, the following naive formulation is simply regularizing the loss by penalty of the norm of the region size. The expressions for the loss of n=1 dimension
is the function of interest and a, b are the left and right bound respectively and λ is a hyperparameter. The update directions to minimize the loss are
. The regularizer will prevent the region to grow to ∞ and the best bounds will be found if loss is minimized with gradient descent or any similar approach. To extend the naive approach to n-dimensions, we will face an another integral in the update direction (hard to compute). Therefore, we deploy the following trapezoid approximation for the integral. Trapezoidal Approximation. The trapezoidal approximation of definite integrals is a first-order approximation from Newton-Cortes formulas for numerical integration [35] . The rule states that
2
. An asymptotic error estimate is given by
. So as long the derivatives are bounded by some lipschitz constant L, then the error becomes bounded by the following |error| ≤ L(b − a) 2 .
Methodology
Typical adversarial pixel attacks involve a neural network agent C (e.g. classifier or detector) that takes an image x ∈ [0, 1] d as input and outputs a multinoulli distribution over K class labels with softmax values [l 1 , l 2 , ..., l K ], where l j is the softmax value for class j. The adversary (attacker) tries to produce a perturbed image x ∈ [0, 1] d that is as close as possible to x , such that C changes its class prediction from x to x .
In our case we consider a more general case where we are interested in the parameters u ∈ Ω ⊂ R n , a hidden latent parameter that generate the image and is passes to scene generator (e.g. a renderer function R) that takes the parameter u and a an object shape S of a class that is identified by C. Ω is the continuous semantic space for the parameters that we intend to study. The renderer creates the image x ∈ R d , and then we study the behavior of a classifier C of that image across multiple shapes and multiple famous DNNs. Now, this function of interest is defined as follows
where z is class label of interest of study and we observe the network score for that class by rendering a shape S z of the same class.The shape and class labels are constants and only the parameters varies for f during analysis.
Region Finding as an Operator
We can visualize the function in Eq (1) for any shape S z as long as the DNN can identify the shape at some region in the semantic space Ω of interest, as we did in Figure 1 . However , plotting such figure is expensive and the complexity of plotting it increase exponentially with a big base. The complexity of plotting this type of semantic maps ( we call Network Semantic Map NSM) is N for n = 1, where N is the number of samples needed for that dimension to be fully characterized. The complexity is N 2 for n = 2, and we can see that for a general dimension n, the complexity 2D case (azimuth angle and elevation angle of camera) with four initial points. We note that the naive approach usually predicts smaller regions, while the OIR formulations finds more comprehensive regions.
AlexNet [23] VGG [34] Resnet50 [19] InceptionV3 [36] Figure 3 right) of four different networks on two shapes of a chair class (top) and cup class (bottom).We note that InceptionV3 is very confident about its decision , but the cost is that it creates semantic "traps" where a sharp fall of performance happens in the middle of a robust region. This behaviour is more apparent for complex shapes (e.g. the chair in top row) of plotting the NMS to fill the semantic space Ω adequately is N n . This number is huge even if we have only moderate dimensionality. Also note that we don't need to specify the whole Ω before finding the robust region around a point u, which is an advantage of SADA [18] . As we will see in Section 4.4, this approach can be used to characterize the space much more efficiently as explained in Section 5, and we use it to measure robustness as in Section 4.4. Explicitly, we defined the region finding as an operator Φ that takes the function of interest in Eq (1) and initial point in the semantic space u ∈ Ω, and a shape S z of some class z. The operator will return the hyper-rectangle D ⊂ Ω where the DNN is robust in the region and doesn't drop the score of the intended class sharply as well as it keeps identifying the shape with label z as illustrated in Figure 4 . The robust-region-finding operator is then defined as follows
(2) where the left and right bounds of D are a = [a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n ] and b = [b 1 , b 2 , ..., b n ], respectively. The two samall thresholds m , v are to insure high performance and low variance of the DNN network in that robust region. We can define the opposite operator which is to find adversarial regions as:
We can show clearly that Φ adv and Φ robust are related
So we can just focus our attentions on Φ robust to find robust regions , and the adversarial regions follows directly from Eq (4). In all our methods, the region of interest D = {u : a ≤ u ≤ b}, Here , we assume the size of the region is positive at every dimension , i.e. r = b − a > 0.
The volume of the region D normalized by exponent of dimension n is expressed as follows
The region D can also be defined in terms of the matrix D of all the corner points
as follows.
where 1 is the all-ones vector of size 2 n , is the Hadamard product of matrices (element-wise) , and M is a constant masking matrix defined as the matrix of binary numbers of n bits that range from 0 to 2n − 1
Deriving Update Directions
Extending Naive to n-dimensions. We start by defining the function vector f D of all function evaluations at all corner points of D
Then using Trapezoid approximation and Leibniz rule of calculus, the loss expression and the update directions.
We show all the derivations for n=1,n=2, and for general-n expression explicitly in the Appendix.
Outer-Inner Ratio Loss (OIR).
We introduce an outer region A, B with bigger area that contains the small region (a, b). We follow the following assumption to insure that outer area is always positive
, where α is the small boundary factor of the outer area to inner area. we formulate the problem as a ratio of outer over inner area and we try to make this ratio as close as possible to 0 . L =
Areaout
Areain By using DencklBeck technique for solving non-linear fractional programming problems [30] . Using their formulation to transform L as follows.
where
is the DencklBeck factor and it is equal to the small objective best achieved.
Black-Box (OIR B).
Here we set λ = 1 to simplify the problem. This yields the following expression of the loss
which is similar to the area contrastive loss in [33] . The update rules would be
To extend to n-dimensions, we define an outer bigger region Q that include the smaller region D and defined as :
, where a, b, r are defined as before, while α is defined as the boundary factor of the outer region in all the dimensions equivalently. The inner region D is defined as in Eq (6) and outer regions can also be defined in terms of the corner points as follows.
Let f D be function vector as in Eq (7) and f Q be another function vector evaluated at all possible outer corner points as follows.
Now the loss and update directions for the n-dimensional case becomes as follows .
Where diag(.) is the diagonal matrix of the vector argument or the diagonal vector of the matrix argument. M Q is the outer region constant matrix defined as follows.
White-Box OIR (OIR W.) The following formulation is white-box in nature ( it need the gradient of the function f in order to update the current estimates of the bound ) this is useful when the function in hand is differntiable ( e.g. DNN ) , to obtain more intelligent regions ,rather then the regions surrounded by near 0 values of the function f . We set λ = α β in Eq (9), where α is the small boundary factor of the outer area, β is the emphasis factor (we will show later how it determines the emphasis on the function vs the gradient). Hence, the objective in Eq (9) becomes :
(14) now since λ * should be small for the optimal objective as λ → 0, α → 0 and hence the derivative in Eq (14) becomes the following.
(15) we can see that the update rule for a and b depends on the function value and the derivative of f at the boundaries a and b respectively, with β controlling the dependence. If β → 0, the update directions in Eq (15) collapse to the unregularized naive update. To extend to n-dimensions, we have to define a term that involves the gradient of the function , which is the all-corners gradient matrix G D . 
, update region volume 0 as in as in Eq (5) for t ← 1 to T do form the all-corners function vector f D as in Eq (11) form the all-corners gradients matrix G D as in Eq (16) form the gradient selection vectors s, s as in Eq (19) (5) end Returns: robust region bounds: aT , bT . Now, the loss and update directions are given as follows.
where the mask is the special mask
s is a weighted sum of the gradient from other dimensions (i = k) contributing to the update direction of dimension k, where k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
The derivation of the 2-dimensional case and n-dimensional case of the OIR formulation is included in the Appendix. We try to use the trapezoid approximation directly on the loss and then differentiate the approximation. We get an expression that involves the derivative of the function, and we obtain an n-dimensional extension for it in the Appendix. However, when applying to find the region it diverges ( probably due to large approximations error). Algorithms 1, and 2 summarize the techniques.
Experiments 4.1. Setup and Data
The semantic parameters u we pick are the azimuth rotations of the viewpoint and the elevation angle from the horizontal plane where the object is always at the center of the rendering, which is common in the literature [18, 20] . We use 100 shapes from 10 different classes from ShapeNet [7] , the largest dataset for 3D models that are normalized in the semantic lens. We filter these 100 shapes from much more shapes to make sure that: (1) the class label is available in ImageNet and that ImageNet classifiers can identify the exact class, (2) the selected shapes are identified by the classifiers at some part of the semantic space. To do this, we measured the average score in the space and accepted the shape only if its average Resnet softmax score is 0.1. To render the images we use differentiable renderer NMR [22] which allows obtaining the gradient to the semantic input parameters.The networks of interest were Resnet50 [19] , VGG [34] , AlexNet [23] , and InceptionV3 [36] . We use the official implementation by Pytorch models [29] . this DNNs
Mapping the Networks
We map the networks similar to Figure 1 , but for all the 100 shapes on the first semantic parameter ( the azimuth rotation) as well as the joint (azimuth and elevation) and show the results in Figure 4 
Growing Semantic Robust Regions
We implement the three bottom-up approaches in Table 2 and Algorithms 1 and 2 and open-source the code on GitHub 1 and provide a tutorial notebook 2 . The hyperparameters were set to η = 0.1, α = 0.05, β = 0.0009λ = 0.1, T = 800. We can observe in Figure 3 that multiple initial points inside the same robust region converge to the same boundary. One key difference to be noted between the naive approach in Eq (8) and the OIR formulations in Eq (12, 17) is that naive approach fails to capture robust regions in some scenarios and fall for trivial regions (see Figure 3 ).
Applications
Quantifying Semantic Robustness. Looking at these NSM can lead to insights about the network, but we would like to develop a systemic approach to quantify the robustness of these DNNs. To do this, we develop the Semantic Robustness Volume Ratio (SRVR) metric. The SVR metric of the network is only the ratio between the expected size of the robust region obtained by Algorithms 1,2 over the nominal total volume of the semantic map of interest. Explicitly, the SRVR of network C for class label z is defined as follows.
where f, Φ are defined in Eq (1,2) respectively. We take the average volume of all the adversarial regions found for multiple initilzations and multiple shapes of the same class z and then divide by the nominal volume of the entire space . This gives a percentage of how close is the DNN from the ideal behaviour of identifying the object robustly in the entire space. The SRVR metric is not strict in its value since the analyzer define the semantic space of interest and the shapes used. However, SRVR relative score from one DNN to another DNN is of extreme importance as it conveys information about the network that might not be clear by only observing the accuracy of the network. For example, we can see in Table 1 that while InceptionV3 [36] is the best in terms of accuracy, it lags behind Resnet50 [19] in terms of semantic robustness. This observation is also consistent with the qualitative NSMs in Figure 4 in which we can see that while Inception is very confident, it can fail completely inside these confident regions. Note that the reported SRVR results are averaged over all the 10 classes over all the 100 shapes, and we use 4 constant initial points for all experiments and the semantic parameters are the azimuth and elevation as in Figure 3 ,4. As can be seen in Figure 3 different methods predict different regions , so we take the average size of the the three methods used (naive, OIR W, OIR B) to give a middle estimate of the volume used in the SRVR results reported in Table 1 .
Finding Semantic Bias in the Data. While looking at the above figures are mesmerizing and can generate a lot of insight about the DNNs and the training data of ImageNet [31] , that does not allow to make a conclusion either about the network nor about the data. Therefore, we can average these semantic maps of these networks to factor out the effect of the network structure and training and maintain only the data effect . we show two such maps ( we call Data Semantic Map DSM). We can see that the networks have holes in the semantic maps that are shared among DNNs, indicating bias in the data. Identifying this gap in the data can help training a more semantically robust network by adversarial training on these data-based adversarial regions as performed in the adversarial attack literature [14] . Figure shows an example of such semantic map which shows how the data in ImageNet [31] did not have such angles of the easy cup class. 
Analysis
First, by observing the figures of the 1D plots (as in Figure 2) , we can see that we can have robust regions in which lie adversarial regions. These "traps" are dangerous in ML since it is hard to identify (without NSM) and they can cause failure cases for some models. These traps can be either attributed to the model architecture and training and loss or can be attributed to the bias in the dataset from which the model was trained (i.e. ImageNet [31] . In Section 4.4 we study the effect of data bias on these results. Here, we are interested more on the effect of the training, architecture, and any reason that might create a unique signature of the network on the 2D semantic map. One obvious reason is the trade-off between accuracy and robustness, which is well established in the field of pixel perturbation robustness [3, 11] .
Note plotting NMS is extremely expensive even for a moderate dimensionality e.g. n = 8. To see this , for the plot in Figure 1 we use N = 180 points in the range of 360 degrees. If all the other dimensionality require the same number N = 180 of samples for their individual range , the total joint space requires 180 n = 180 8 = 1.1 * 10 18 samples, which is million times the number of stars in the universe. Evaluating the DNN for that many forward passes is impossible. Thus, we follow a different approach, a bottomup one, where we start from one point in the semantic space u 0 and we grow an n-dimensional hyper-rectangle around that point to find the robust "neighborhood" of that point for this specific neural network. For example in Figure 1 , we have 3 robust regions , so we would expect 3 8 = 6561 regions if n = 8, and we need about 2 8 = 256 samples to fill in all the regions (assuming the regions fill half the space), and 500 * 2 n = 128K samples to find the region around the point. So in total we only need 500 * 4 n * 3 n = 8. * 10 We can see that InceptionV3 is the most accurate network (Table 1 ), but it is less robust (Table 1 and Figure 4 ) and it jumps sharply between very confident regions to almost zero confidence. This behavior violates our condition for the robust semantic region as in Eq (2), and it is reflected on the qualitative and quantitative results. A possible explanation of this behaviour of disassociation between cognition and abstract geometric inception comes from Neuroscience. Recent research shows that human brain process geometry and other semantic aspects unconsciously, before using the conscious-mind to identify objects [21] , which indicates primitive understanding can be disassociate from the identification task (e.g. classification).
Conclusion
We analyse DNNs from a semantic lens and show how more confident networks tend to create adversarial semantic regions inside highly confident regions. We developed a bottom-up approach to analyse the networks semantically by growing adversarial regions, which scales well with dimensionality and we use it to benchmark the semantic robustness of DNNs. We aim to investigate how to use the insights we gain from this work to develop and train semantically robust networks from the start while maintaining the accuracy. Another direct extension of our work is to develop large scale semantic robustness challenge where we label these robust/adversarial regions in the semantic space and release some of them to allow for training and then we test the trained models on hidden test set to measure robustness while reporting the accuracy on ImageNet validation set to make sure that the features of the model did not get affected by the robust training.
A. Analyzing Deep Neural Networks
Here we visualize different Network semantic maps generated during our analysis. In the 1D case we fix the elevation of the camera to a nominal angle of 35
• and rotate around the object. In the 2D case, we change both the elevation and azimuth around the object. These maps can be generated to any type of semantic parameters that affect the generation of the image , and not viewing angle.
A.1. Networks Semantic Maps (1D)
In Figure 6 ,7 we visualize the 1D semantic maps of rotating around the object and recording different DNNs performance and averaging the profile over 10 different shapes per class.
A.2. Networks Semantic Maps (2D)
In Figure 8 ,9 we visualize the 2D semantic maps of elevation angles and rotating around the object and recording different DNNs performance and averaging the maps over 10 different shapes per class.
A.3. Convergence of the Region Finding Algorithms
Here we show how when we apply the region detection algorithms; the naive detect the smallest region while the OIR formulations detect bigger more general robust region. This result happens even with different initial points; they always converge to the same bounds of that robust region of the semantic maps. Figure 10 show 4 different initializations for 1D case along with predicted regions. In Figure 11,12 shows the bounds evolving during the optimization of the three algorithms (naive , OIR B and OIR W ) for 500 steps.
A.4. Examples of Found Regions ( with Example
Renderings)
In Figure 13 ,14 we provide examples of 2D regions found with the three algorithms along with renderings of the shapes from the robust regions detected.
A.5. Analyzing Semantic Data Bias in ImageNet
In Figure 15 ,16, we visualizing semantic data bias in the common training dataset (i.e. ImageNet Figure 10 . We can see that OIR formulations converge to the same bounds of the robust region regardless of the initialization, which indicates effectiveness in detecting these regions, unlike the naive approach which can stop in a local optimum. Figure 10 . We can see that OIR formulations converge to the same bounds of the robust region regardless of the initialization, which indicates effectiveness in detecting these regions, unlike the naive approach which can stop in a local optimum. To solve the issue of bounds diverging we propose the following formulations for one dimensional bounds , and then we extend them to n-dimensions , which allows for finding the n-dimensional semantic robust/adversarial regions that are similar to figure 2 . some of the formulations are black-box in nature ( they dint need the gradient of the function f in order to update the current estimates of the bound ) while others .
B.2. Naive Approach
using Libeniz rule as in Lemma B.1, we get the following update steps for the objective L :
where λ is regularizing the boundaries not to extend too much in the case the function evaluation wa positive all the time.
Extension to n-dimension:. Lets start by n = 2. Now, we have f : R 2 → (0, 1), then we define the loss integral as a function of four bounds of a rectangular region as follows. 
to find the update direction for the first bound a 1 by taking the partial derivative of the function in Eq (27) we get the following update direction for a 1 along with its trapezoidal approximation in order to able to compute it during the optimization:
Doing similar steps to the first bound for the other three bounds we obtain the full update directions for (a 1 , a 2 
The region D can also be defined in terms of the matrix D of all the corner points {d i } 2 n i=1 as follows.
where 1 is the all-ones vector of size 2 n , is the Hadamard product of matrices (element-wise) , and M is a constant masking matrix defined as the matrix of binary numbers of n bits that range from 0 to 2n − 1 defined as follows. 
We follow similar steps as in n = 2 and obtain the following loss expressions and update directions :
B.3. Outer-Inner Ratio Loss (OIR)
We introduce an outer region A, B with bigger area that contains the small region (a, b). We follow the following assumption to insure that outer area is always positive.
where α is the small boundary factor of the outer area to inner area. We formulate the problem as a ratio of outer over inner area and we try to make this ratio as close as possible to 0 . L =
Areaout
Areain By using DencklBeck technique for solving non-linear fractional programming problems [30] . Using their formulation to transform L as follows. 
where λ * = Area * out Area * in is the DencklBeck factor and it is equal to the small objective best achieved.
Black-Box (OIR B).
Here we set λ = 1 to simplify the problem. This yields 
using Libeniz ruloe as in Lemma B.1, we get the following update steps for the objective L :
Extension to n-dimension:. Lets start by n = 2. Now, we have f : R 2 → (0, 1), and with the following constrains on the outer region.
